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Abstract 
In sharp contrast to results of empirical tests investigating the U.S. market, the announcement of a 
seasoned equity issue by Japanese firms causes stock prices to increase. A major institutional 
difference between the two markets involves the underwriting process through which the offer 
price is set. In the U.S., the offer price is typically set less than 24 hours before the stock is sold 
to the public. Offer prices in Japan, however, are announced a median of seven trading days 
before the end of the subscription period and is set at substantial discount below the current stock 
price. In addition, there are two ways to determine the offering prices, the fixed price method and 
the formula price method. The underwriters7 certification hypothesis fits nicely under this 
institutional environment because fixed price issues offer more certification. Average 
announcement effect for firms using the fixed price method is positive, while the announcement 
effect is zero for the firms using the formula price method. In addition, after controlling for 
offering method, a significant negative correlation is found between the announcement day return 
and the discount. We also examine abnormal returns around the subscription period and issue 
day. 
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PUBLIC PLACEMENTS OF SEASONED EQUITY ISSUES IN JAPAN 
Empirical studies performed over the last several years have clearly documented that the 
average stock price reaction to the announcement of a public seasoned equity issue by a United 
States corporation is negative.1 In sharp contrast to the U.S. result, evidence by Kato and 
Schallheim (1993) and Kang and Stulz (1995) support a positive (or at least non-negative) stock 
price reaction to the announcement of new equity issues by Japanese corporations. In this study, 
we provide additional evidence supporting a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of 
seasoned equity issues in Japan and a thorough empirical investigation of the entire period 
surrounding the new equity issue. 
Three potential sources for the contrasting announcement effects of seasoned equity issues 
in Japan and the U.S. are: (1) institutional differences in the underwriting process and market 
microstructure, (2) firm specific differences, and (3) differences in general market conditions. In 
this study, we primarily focus on the first potential cause for the differences in the announcement-
day effect.2 We provide evidence that supports a significant role for the underwriter of Japanese 
equity issues that is consistent with the positive announcement-day effect. In addition, while our 
evidence contradicts the well-known theory developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), our results 
are supportive of the Cooney and Kalay (1993) modification to the Myers and Majluf model.3 
The key difference between the U.S. and Japanese equity-issue processes is the timing and 
1
 For examples, see Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), Schipper and Smith (1986), and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988). 
2
 Kang and Stulz focus more attention on the second and third potential explanations for the 
differing announcement effects. 
3
 The predictions of the Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) dividend signaling model and the 
Cooney and Kalay model are similar. 
method of determining the offer price. In Japan, the offer price is determined several days before 
the beginning of the subscription period and one to two weeks prior to the issue day and is set at a 
substantial discount below the current market value for the firm's stock. We argue that this puts 
the Japanese underwriter in a position in which it certifies the discounted offer price as the 
minimum value for the issuing firm's common stock for the period between the offer-price 
determination day and the day that the stock issue has been fully subscribed. Intuitively, 
underwriter certification at the offer price "truncates" investors' distribution of possible stock 
values and leads to an upward re-evaluation of the stock price. In the U.S., offer prices are 
typically set less than 24 hours before the stock issue is sold to investors [Smith (1977)]; 
therefore, U.S. underwriters do not provide a similar guarantee of value. 
The decline in the mean discount over the 20 years used in our study, as well as the cross-
sectional variation in discounts across issuing firms fits nicely with the certification hypothesis: 
low discounts imply a high offer price, resulting in a high announcement return. Consistent with 
this, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the discount and the 
announcement return. This result is robust to various specifications of the regression model, 
including a control for the declining discounts through time. 
In December of 1983, near the mid-point of the sampling period used in this study, a new 
variation of the equity issue process was introduced in Japan called the formula-price stock 
offering. In this type of offering, the underwriter does not provide the same level of certification 
as the traditional fixed-price offerings outlined above. Consistent with this decreased level of 
certification, the average abnormal return surrounding the announcement of a formula-price 
offering is significantly lower than for a fixed-price offering. 
2 
Kang and Stulz find a negative stock price reaction on the common stock's issue day and 
we confirm this issue day result. Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) present evidence concerning 
issue day effects in the U.S., arguing that there is an order-flow imbalance on the issue day 
because buyers can enter the primary market to save transaction costs. This imbalance in the 
secondary market leads to more trades at the bid price on the issue day. They do find order-flow 
imbalances in U.S. data, but do not find significant price reversals after the issue which would be 
expected as future closing prices are less likely to be at the bid price. Kang and Stulz do not find 
significant evidence supporting this explanation of the issue day price drop using Japanese data. 
Our results, however, do show significant price reversals after the issue date and therefore are 
consistent with the Lease, Masulis, and Page model. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief history of seasoned equity 
issues in Japan, including some of the changes in the process precipitated by the powerful 
Japanese Ministry of Finance. Section II presents a theoretical argument of underwriter 
certification of issuing firm value and its effect on the announcement day stock price reaction. In 
this section, we also discuss theories addressing issue day stock price reactions. Section III 
presents the data description and methodology. Section IV exhibits our event study results and 
section V presents further tests of the certification hypothesis. We summarize our analysis in 
section VI. 
I. BACKGROUND ON SEASONED EQUITY ISSUES IN JAPAN 
Prior to the mid 1970s, almost all equity issues by Japanese firms were rights offerings to 
existing shareholders, with only the unpurchased shares being sold in the public market. The offer 
3 
price for the rights offering was typically set at 50 yen, which is par value for most Japanese 
stock. In January 1969, Nihon Gakki, a musical instrument maker, successfully made an 
underwritten public offering with the offer price based on the stock's market value [Kunimura and 
Iihara (1985), p. 231]. Since then, the number of public equity offerings has been increasing. The 
public offering price, although higher than the par value, was set at a substantial discount below 
the stock's market value until the early 1980s and many of the shares of these discounted issues 
were allocated to friendly investors or firms called oyabike (parent's advantage). 
Until 1973, the oyabike issue, which resembles a private placement, dominated the equity 
issue market.4 However, in February of 1973, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) gradually started to 
restrict the oyabike transactions.5 This initial guideline restricted oyabike transactions to no more 
than 40 percent of new equity shares. In October 1976, the ceiling became 20 percent and finally, 
in February 1983, the MOF informally prohibited all oyabike transactions except for ESOPs 
(employee stock ownership plans), for maintaining the ownership structure for joint venture firms, 
and for subsidiaries issuing stock. Also during this period, the MOF placed restrictions on 
corporate purchases of newly issued shares. In February 1981, no more than 50 percent of new 
shares could be purchased by corporations; this number was reduced to 30 percent in February 
4
 There are several reasons why firms used the quasi-public issues with oyabike instead of a 
true private placement. First, the issuer uses the help of the underwriter to allocate the new 
shares to friendly investors or corporations which are in the issuing firm's keiretsu group (a unique 
Japanese form of industrial organization). Second, private placements restrict the firm from 
issuing new equity for two years. Third, private placements are often associated with firms that 
are in financial distress. Finally, the underwriter, being a member of the keiretsu group, receives 
financial support through the underwriting fees. 
5
 We describe the role of the MOF in loose terms. Although the major underwriters appear to 
restrict the oyabike on their own, the MOF often provided indirect or informal guidance. 
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1983. 
Table 1 shows the time series of the average discount (percentage difference between the 
offer price and the stock's closing price on the day before the offer-price determination day). The 
average discount rates in the early 1970s were very high with offer prices typically more than 10 
percent below the stock's market price. In February 1973, the MOF and the major underwriters 
informally agreed to lower the discount. In February 1977, the eight major underwriters 
announced a target range for the discount of less than 8 percent. The average discount finally fell 
to around 3 and 1/2 percent after 1983 (oyabike transactions were also eliminated in 1983).6 
Currently, there are two ways to determine the offering price of a seasoned equity issue in 
Japan, the fixed-price method and the formula-price method. Until November 1983, however, 
the offering price could only be determined by the fixed-price method. For the fixed-price 
method, the offering price is announced several days before the beginning of the subscription 
period.7 To help shorten the interval between the announcement of the offer price and the 
subscription period, the MOF allowed the formula-price method to be introduced. Under the 
formula-price method, the offering price is determined based on a pre-specified day's closing 
price, usually only a few days before the beginning of the subscription period. In December 1983, 
NEC became the first firm to announce the use of a formula method offering with the new shares 
being issued in February 1984. Also under the formula-price method, a minimum offering price, 
6
 It is interesting to note that the oyabike transactions were allowed for convertible bonds and 
warrants issues until April 1988. For this period, convertible bonds and warrants could have been 
issued to maintain the corporate ownership structure. 
7
 In Japan, investors make orders to purchase new shares during the subscription period, 
normally two to five days long. Payment for the shares is made by the end of the subscription 
period with the new shares being issued to the purchasers several days later. 
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often set at 15 percent below the current stock price, is announced. If the offering price is below 
this minimum offering price, the offering is canceled. Fixed-price offerings cannot be canceled. 
Therefore, the two major differences between the fixed-price and formula-price method is the 
period of time between the offer-price determination day and the subscription period and the 
formula method's cancellation feature. 
Prior to January 1983, Japanese Securities Exchange Law guidelines required a minimum 
of 30 days between the day the registration statement was filed with the MOF and the beginning 
of the subscription period. However, a shorter time period (23 days for the period, from 1983 to 
1987 and 15 days for the period, from 1987 to 1988) is allowed for firms that meet certain 
disclosure guidelines established by the MOF; this requirement is typically only met by large, well-
known firms. Starting in August of 1988, the minimum time was shortened to 15 days for all 
firms. Again, a shorter time interval (7 days) is allowed for certain firms. Once the minimum 
registration period is met, the equity offering is formally in effect and the underwriters can begin 
their sales activities. 
One other restriction limits the ability of the firm to make a speedy issue of common 
stock. Japanese commercial law requires at least 14 days between the day all necessary 
information about the equity offering is released and the payment day (the payment day is the day 
that the underwriter pays the proceeds of the stock issue to the issuing firm). Therefore, under 
the formula price method, if the firm's announcement of the equity issue includes notice of which 




Equity offerings by Japanese firms differ from U.S. corporate common stock offerings in 
two important ways. First, the offering price for a Japanese stock issue is determined several days 
before the subscription period while offer prices in the U.S. are set less than 24 hours before the 
new stock is sold to investors. Second, these offer prices are set at a substantial discount below 
the stock's market value on the offer-price determination day. New shares in the U.S. are not sold 
at a discount on the New York and American stock exchanges, although a discount does appear 
on the NASDAQ [Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991)]. The significant time period between 
the determination of the offer price and the subscription period means that firm commitment 
offerings impose higher risks on Japanese underwriters than on their U.S. counterparts. 
To minimize the potential for losses, we argue that the Japanese underwriter will refuse to 
offer stock of a corporation unless it can be assured that the "true" value of the common stock is 
no lower than the offering price. In this sense, we rely on the asymmetric information model 
developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and extended by Cooney and Kalay (1993). In these 
models, managers possess more precise information about the value of a firm's existing assets and 
growth opportunities than potential purchasers of the firm's stock. A critical assumption is that 
managers cannot credibly reveal their private information to the public. For example, it is unlikely 
that outside investors would believe unsubstantiated claims by management. Moreover, a detailed 
information release to the public, defending a high value, could give an advantage to the firm's 
competitors. 
It is possible, however, to make a stock offering to a small group of investors which 
would allow managers the ability to reveal their private information without fear of a disclosure to 
7 
competitors. Hertzel and Smith (1993) use this explanation as a possible reason for the observed 
difference in stock market reaction for private vs. public issues of common stock. The 
announcements of private equity issues elicit a positive stock price reaction, both in the U.S. and 
Japan. [See also Wruck (1989) for U.S. evidence and Kato and Schallheim (1993) for evidence in 
Japan.] 
In the same way, management can reveal their private information about firm value to the 
underwriter. Since the Japanese underwriter must agree on the stock's sales price well before the 
subscription period, its concerns are similar to the private investor. There are several compelling 
arguments for this assertion. First, during the time period between the offer-price determination 
day and the day the stock offering is fully subscribed, the stock's market value will likely move 
towards its true value as outside investors receive more information about the firm. Second, the 
underwriter has the incentive to properly price the new issue to maintain its reputation for future 
business and this concern for reputation makes the certification believable by investors.8 Third, 
Japanese underwriters are often members of the issuing firm's keiretsu, the uniquely Japanese 
form of industrial organization. If a member of the keiretsu, the underwriter is already closely tied 
to the issuing firm through interlocking boards of directors, the same close banking relation 
(called the main bank), and long-term business relations. This arrangement facilitates the easy 
transfer of the private information from the issuing corporation to the underwriter. For these 
reasons, the underwriter's agreement to sell the new stock issue signals (certifies) to the market 
that it thinks that the true stock value is at least as great as the offer price. 
8
 Evidence supporting underwriter reputation models are presented by Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990). 
8 
The certification hypothesis, in which the underwriter guarantees the value of the issuing 
firm, is not new. Booth and Smith (1986) argue that underwriters provide a valuable service by 
certifying the validity of the issuing firm's current stock price. Denis (1991) provides evidence 
consistent with the certification hypothesis in finding that the announcement day effects of 
traditional underwritten equity issues are less negative than those for shelf registration issues. 
Because underwriter certification is not provided with a shelf registration issue, a lower (more 
negative) stock price response is expected for a shelf issue than the non-shelf registered offerings. 
The discount plays a pivotal role in our analysis. Because the discount measures the 
difference between the offer price and the market value measured on the day before the offer-
price determination day, the underwriter's certification of value is of less significance if the 
discount is large. However, for low discounts, firm commitment offerings signal a high valuation 
for the firm, which we suggest translates to a positive announcement effect. 
After November 1983, the selection by issuing firms and their underwriters of fixed-price 
versus formula-price offerings provides a unique test of this underwriter certification hypothesis. 
The main difference between these two types of offerings is the time period from the offer-price 
determination date to the subscription period.9 The shorter period for formula offerings reduces 
the probability that the stock price will fall below the offering price before investors have agreed 
to purchase the new shares of stock. Therefore, the formula-price method is less risky for the 
underwriter and does not provide the same level of certification as the fixed-price method. 
This difference between the fixed-price and formula-price offerings are somewhat 
9
 Another difference between the two methods is the formula-price offering's cancellation 
feature. However, formula offerings can only be canceled up until the offer-price determination 
day. Therefore, this is no longer an important difference once the offer price has been set. 
9 
analogous to the difference between non-shelf and shelf offerings studied by Denis (1991) and in a 
similar way, stock price reactions to fixed-price offering announcements should be higher than the 
stock price reaction to formula-price offering announcements. 
An explanation for the negative issue-day returns is provided by Lease, Masulis, and Page 
(1991). Their argument involves an order-flow imbalance on the issue day because, in the U.S., 
individuals can save transaction costs by purchasing in the primary market, where there are no 
brokerage commissions. This leaves the secondary market with primarily sell orders resulting in 
more transactions occurring at the bid than at the ask price. Following the stock issue date, 
normal amounts of buy and sell orders will cause an increase in the observed closing stock price. 
Since Japanese investors cannot purchase in the primary market on the issue day (they must 
subscribe during the subscription period which ends prior to the issue day), we should be able to 
observe an order-flow imbalance during the subscription period. 
In addition, there certainly are incentives on the part of investors who purchased discount 
shares to sell on the issue day, causing a similar order-flow imbalance. Although there are no 
explicit bid and ask prices in the Japanese stock market, there are, naturally, implicit bid and ask 
prices. Thus a decline in stock prices on the issue day and a rebound stock price on the following 
day is consistent with this explanation.10 
10
 Parsons and Raviv (1985) provide a theoretical model that shows that new seasoned equity 
will be offered at a price below the market price. In their model of asymmetric information about 
heterogenous investors, the underwriter will set the offering price below the price at which the 
most high-valuation investors are willing to purchase because of the fear of under subscription. 
On the other hand, high-value investors bid up the market price to a level higher than the offering 
price because of the threat of oversubscription. This model predicts that the pre- and post-issue 
day stock price will be higher than the offer price. However, the Parsons and Raviv model 
requires that the offer price and the amount of under- or oversubscription be unknown. This is 
not the case in Japan. 
10 
III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
Our initial data base consists of all public, seasoned, common stock offerings from 
Japanese corporations listed in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) during the 
period January 1974 to March 1993. As discussed in the first section, public offering was not 
common among Japanese firms until early 1970s. Therefore, our period covers a majority of 
public offerings in Japan. Firm names, announcement and issue dates, discounts and offer prices 
were collected from various issues of the Commercial Law Review. 
Firms that made simultaneous rights offerings, stock splits, or stock dividends were 
eliminated from our data set, as were 72 observations where the issuing firm was not included in 
our accounting data base (described below) or was not identified in that data base as a firm from 
the first section of the TSE as of the close of the month prior to the equity issue announcement. 
Twenty observations were eliminated where the firm's stock was sold via a "standby agreement" 
by the underwriter, leaving 703 "whole purchase" underwritten public offerings. Of these 
observations, 304 issued common stock only once during the period investigated in our study, 
129 firms issued two times, 33 firms issued three times, 8 firms issued four times, and 2 firms 
issued five times. Stock return data was not available for a number of firms, particularly for those 
firms issuing during the late 1970s. This eliminated 72 observations from the sample. Another 58 
observations were dropped due to a lack of sufficient returns data. This left a final total of 573 
observations in our sample with announcement dates from February 1974 to August 1991.11 
11
 We require that returns are available for at least half of the estimation and event periods. 
Therefore, depending on the estimation technique, estimation period, and/or event period chosen, 
11 
Yearly number of offerings, average and total yen value of the stock offerings, and the 
average, maximum, and minimum discount are given in Table 1. Total issues and the yen value of 
those issues peaked in 1989; the Tokyo stock market also peaked in late 1989. Although there 
were 19 stock issues in 1990, all were announced by the end of February and issued to the public 
by April 2, 1990. The Tokyo stock markets crashed in early 1990. Several equity offerings using 
the formula method were canceled in early 1990 because the offering prices were not as high as 
the minimum offering prices. The MOF informally stopped public equity offerings in April of 
1990. 
The average discount has been declining over our sample period, falling from an average 
of 9.35 percent in 1974 to 3.50 percent on 1991. Most of this decrease occurred from the period 
1976 to 1984. Market-wide figures, obtained from the TSE fact book and Daiwa Securities, are 
also presented for comparison purposes. Our sample includes 20 percent of the total number of 
public issues from TSE firms during this period, but encompasses 46 percent of the yen value of 
those issues. 
Equity issues in our sample were spread among 23 of the 26 industry groups with most 
issue announcements from firms in the banking industry (71 issues). Trading companies and 
electronic companies followed with 56 and 55 issues respectively. Observations were also 
aggregated into major industry categories. A total of 364 of the equity issue announcements were 
made by manufacturing companies. Financial companies made 110 announcements, followed by: 
trading companies (56), retail/wholesale (29), transportation (9), and service (5). 
the number of observations is sometimes less than 573. 
12 
B. Time Line of the Stock Issue Process 
One of the important pieces of information in our data base consists of various 
announcement and transaction dates for seasoned equity issues. If one considers a time line of the 
dates involved in the offering process, it appears as follows: 
1. Analyst Announcement Day (Analyst Ann.) - Newspaper date of a story reporting that a 
stock market analyst predicted a future common stock offering by the firm. 
2. Manager Announcement Day (Manager Ann.) - Newspaper date of a story reporting that the 
firm's management disclosed that the firm will be issuing common stock in the near future. 
3. First Board Meeting (Board 1) - The first board meeting date announcing the stock issue 
(used as first official announcement day for our sample). Information from the board meeting, 
including the offering method, fixed versus formula, is posted at the TSE and the registration 
statement is submitted to the MOF on this day or shortly after this date. 
4. Newspaper Announcement (News 1) - Voluntary announcement in the newspaper, typically 
one day after the first board meeting. Some firms skip this announcement and make the formal 
announcement after the second board meeting (listed below as News 2). 
5. Second Board Meeting (Board 2) - The second board meeting date. Detailed information 
about the offering is released, including offering price (and indirectly, the discount) if the fixed-
price method is used. If a formula-price offering, the offer-price determination day, discount, and 
the cancellation price are announced. Information from this board meeting is posted after the 
close of the market and, therefore, would be reflected in the following day's stock price.12 
6. Newspaper Announcement (News 2) - Announcement in the newspaper is required at this 
time. Only the earlier of the two dates, News 1 or News 2, are collected. 
7. Formula Offer-Price Determination Day (Formula OP Dei) - For formula offerings the offer 
price is determined based on this day's closing price and the discount. 
8. Ending Date of the Subscription Period (Subscription - End) - Stock price stabilization by 
the underwriters extends from the day after the offering-price is set to this day. The payment 
must be made by this day. 
9. Issue Day - One day after the payment day. The payment day is the day that the firm receives 
12
 Some firms combine the first and second board meetings, setting all the terms of the offering 
at the same time. In this case, the first and second board meeting dates would be the same. 
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the proceeds of the new issue (less commissions) from the underwriter. 
Table 2 presents the average time between these various dates. For the entire sample, the 
median number of trading days between the first board meeting date and the issue day is 46 days. 
One of the advantages of the formula-price method of offering new equity is the shorter time from 
the announcement day to the issue day. Our sample statistics verify this shorter period; firms that 
employ the fixed-price offering method have a median of 50 trading days between the first board 
meeting date and the issue date as compared to 25 trading days for firms using the formula 
method. Because only fixed-price offerings were allowed during the first half of our sample 
period, we also examine issue announcements after November 1983 when both fixed-price and 
formula-price offerings were permitted. Although there is support for a shorter time between 
announcement and issue days in this later period, we still find that fixed-price offers result in a 
longer median time period from the announcement date to the issue day, 36.5 trading days vs. the 
25 days for the formula method. Also, the offer price determination day and the end of 
subscription period is seven trading days for fixed offerings and only four trading days for formula 
offerings. 
Another period of interest is the time between Board 2 and Formula OP Det. For 
formula-price offerings, the offering is canceled if the offering price is below the minimum offer 
price; after Formula OP Det, the offering can no longer be canceled. The maximum, median, and 
minimum number of trading days between these two dates are 15, 5, and 2 days respectively. 
For our event study analysis, we primarily use the first board meeting date as our 
announcement day. Announcements in the newspaper prior to the first board meeting obviously 
complicate the analysis. For example, security analysts speculated that 124 firms in our sample 
14 
would issue equity. These newspaper accounts of the analyst reports, found in the Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun, the Japanese equivalent of the Wall Street Journal, occurred an average of 51.6 trading 
days (48 days for the median) before the first board meeting date. For 112 firms in our sample, 
the Nihon Keizai Shinbun also contained a story reporting managers' announcement of an 
upcoming equity issue. These newspaper accounts of manager's announcements appeared on 
average 3.4 trading days (0 days for the median) before the first board meeting. Announcements 
of the new equity issue prior to the first board meeting will certainly diminish the surprise and will 
tend to bias our results toward the null hypothesis of no abnormal return. 
The median time from the first board meeting date to the earlier of "News 1" or "News 2" 
(the first newspaper story after the first board meeting) is one trading day. Since the Kang and 
Stulz study uses the newspaper release date as the announcement date, their event window is 
approximately one day after our event window. 
C. Event Study Methods 
Cumulative abnormal returns over various event periods are calculated by subtracting the 
stock's normal return from its actual return. Daily stock returns were provided by Yamaichi 
Research Institute and Daiwa Securities. The Tokyo Stock Price Index (Topix), value weighted 
index of all first section firms from the TSE, was selected as the market index for our event 
study. 
Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) caution researchers that abnormal return 
calculations over long periods tend to be sensitive to the method used to determine the normal 
return. Since some of these event periods are quite long, we calculate the normal return using 
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four different methods: ordinary least square (OLS) market-model method, Scholes-Williams 
(1977) method, mean-adjusted method, and the market-adjusted method. In addition, we 
investigate two different estimation periods, a post-issue day period and a pre-announcement day 
period. This results in seven different estimates of the abnormal return (the market-adjusted 
method does not use an estimation period). The post-issue estimation period is the 140 trading 
days starting 31 days after the issue date. The pre-announcement estimation period is the 140 
trading days starting 390 trading days before the first board meeting date, Board I13 The post-
issue estimation period is used to determine abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement 
period and the pre-announcement estimation period is used to examine the post-issue period. 
Both estimation periods are used in the analysis of the period immediately surrounding Board 1 
and Issue Day. Significant run-ups or run-downs in the stock price during one or both of these 
periods could bias the calculation of the "normal" return. We address this bias by also calculating 
abnormal returns over the entire period employing the market-adjusted method which does not 
use an estimation period. 
Several of the issuing firms' stocks trade infrequently. For the first two estimation 
methods, OLS and Scholes-Williams, we only use one-day returns in the estimation of the market 
13
 The post-issue estimation period begins 31 trading days after the issue day and the 
preannouncement estimation period ends 251 trading days before Board 1. These particular 
estimation periods were selected for two reasons. 1) The MOF closely examines the issuing 
firm's stock price volatility for the period starting three months, or approximately 70 trading days, 
before the first board meeting to one month, or approximately 23 trading days, after the issue day. 
Excess volatility is likely to result in the MOF's (informal) cancellation of the stock offering. 
During this period, therefore, the underwriter and issuing firm have an incentive to stabilize the 
stock price. 2) As documented in Table 3, in several instances analysts speculate that the sample 
firm will issue stock before the official announcement at Board 1. These newspaper stories are as 
much as 218 trading days before Board L 
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model parameters (alpha and beta). An observation is eliminated from the sample if there are 
fewer than 70 one-day returns in the 140-day estimation period. This requirement eliminates 43 
of the 573 observations in our sample. To calculate the normal return under the mean-adjusted 
method, we use one-day and multiple-day returns. In this case, we require that there be at least 
70 one-day or multiple-day returns during estimation period; therefore only 22 observations were 
eliminated using the mean-adjusted return method. No estimation period is used for the market-
adjusted method allowing the use of all 573 observations. 
IV. EVENT STUDY RESULTS 
A. Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Figure 1 graphs the average cumulative abnormal return using the market-adjusted method 
for the period from 500 trading days before the announcement of the equity issue {Board 1) to 
550 trading days after announcement. The asymmetrical alignment of days reflects the fact that 
the issue date is a median of 46 trading days after Board 1. All observations as well as two 
subsamples are presented on the graph: fixed-price offerings from December 1983 to August 
1991, and formula-price offerings over the same period. On average, issuing firms from all 
samples outperform the market during the pre-announcement period. The abnormal performance 
after announcement also appears to be positive. It is also interesting to note that firms that issue 
using the fixed-price method appear to experience a greater pre-announcement abnormal price 
increase than firms using the formula-price method. 
Table 3 presents the mean cumulative abnormal return for five periods of interest. The 
first two, Board l.
-500 to_2 (Panel A) and Board l_70to_2 (Panel B), are used to investigate abnormal 
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returns during the pre-announcement period. The immediate effect of the equity issue 
announcement is calculated by examining the three days surrounding the first board meeting, 
Board 7_7 to +1 (Panel C). The period from one day before the first board meeting to one day after 
the issue date, Board 1_2 to Issue Day+1 (Panel D), is intended to pick up the entire abnormal 
stock price effect associated with the announcement and issue of common stock. Finally, the 
post-issue period is also presented, Issue Day+2to+500 (Panel E). Because the announcement 
effects in Japan differ so significantly from the results of numerous studies in the U.S, Table 3 
presents results using all four estimation techniques, OLS market model, Scholes-Williams, mean-
adjusted, and market-adjusted, and both estimation periods, pre-announcement and post-issue. 
Supporting the information presented in Figure 1, Japanese firms, like U.S. firms, issue 
following a statistically significant abnormal stock price increase. For the preannouncement 
period Board l.500to_2, all of the statistically significant results are positive. For the period from 
500 to 2 trading days before the announcement, the average CAR ranges from +17.4 percent to 
+52.5 percent. As a comparison to U.S. results, Asquith and Mullins (1986) report a mean CAR 
for seasoned equity issues on the AMEX and NYSE of 40.4 percent for the period from 490 to 
11 days prior to the announcement.14 
For the pre-announcement period Board l_70to_2, the results are mixed. The mean-adjusted 
returns using the post-issue estimation period and market-adjusted returns are significantly 
positive, but the OLS market model and Scholes-Williams model using the pre-announcement 
estimation period show significant negative abnormal returns. The other three estimates are 
14Loughran and Ritter (1995) report a 72 percent mean raw return during the year before 
issue. 
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insignificant. An explanation for these conflicting results is seen by examining the market-
adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for the two estimation periods. The CAR for the pre-
announcement estimation period {Board l.390to.25i) ls +7.73 percent (t-stat = 7.89) and the CAR 
for the post-issue estimation period (Issue Day+31 to+170) is +1.89 percent (t-stat = 2.20). 
Therefore, the estimates of "normal7 returns are likely to be high, resulting in a downward bias in 
the calculation of abnormal event-period returns, particularly using the pre-announcement 
estimation period. One other explanation that is consistent with the lower abnormal returns 
during the period from 70 to 2 days before the announcement concerns the possibility of 
(informal) stock price stabilization by the underwriter. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the mean CAR for the three-day event period around Board 7, 
which ranges from +0.36 percent to +0.72 percent, depending on the estimation method and 
estimation period chosen. The result is consistent with Kato and Schallheim (1993) and Kang and 
Stulz (1995). The result is statistically significant and robust to the different estimation methods 
and periods. These results are in sharp contrast to the results in the U.S. where equity issue 
announcements elicit an abnormal stock return of approximately -3 percent [Smith (1986)]. 
The evidence for a positive announcement effect is reinforced by examination of the 
period from one day before the first board meeting to one day after the issue date. All methods 
using a post-issue estimation period and the market-adjusted return method show positive and 
highly significant mean CARs, ranging from +2.35 percent to +4.38 percent. Consistent with the 
downward bias discussed above, the use of a pre-announcement estimation period dampens the 
results considerably with each method showing insignificant t-stats. 
For the post-issue period, Issue Day+2 to +5m the CAR is significantly negative. Again, the 
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use of the pre-announcement estimation period causes a downward bias in the CARs. This bias is 
confirmed by the significant positive market-adjusted CARs of 6.22 percent and 9.93 percent for 
the two post-issue periods. In fact, the market-adjusted returns are significantly positive for all 
five periods shown in Table 3. These positive abnormal returns do not appear to be caused by the 
risk level of these stocks, or by changes in risk. The average Scholes-Williams beta for these 
issuing stocks is 0.982 before announcement and 0.966 after issue. 
As mentioned above, a number of the sample firms trade infrequently. To reduce the bias 
associated with infrequent trading, the remainder of this paper will use the method developed by 
Scholes and Williams to calculate alpha and beta estimates from a post-issue estimation period. 
We use the post-issue estimation period to avoid the downward bias presented by the pre-
announcement estimation period. This approach is consistent with the methodology used by 
several researchers using U.S. returns [see Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Masulis and Korwar 
(1986)]. 
In summary, the results in Table 3 supports the following conclusions: 1) Consistent with 
empirical studies investigating the U.S. market, Japanese firms issue equity following a 
statistically significant run-up in stock price. 2) Unlike the U.S., the equity issue announcement 
effect is positive in Japan. In particular, the three-day announcement period return is significantly 
positive, around one-half percent and the announcement day to issue day return also appears to be 
significantly positive. 
B. Daily Abnormal Returns Around the Announcements, Subscription period and Issue Days 
Daily prediction errors for the period from 5 days before to 5 days after the announcement 
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date, Board 7, are presented in Panel A of Table 4. Significantly positive abnormal returns are 
found for the day before and the day of the first board meeting, but insignificant results for the day 
after the board meeting. The significant return on the day before the board meeting is not easily 
explained, but is consistent with the leakage of information.15 The result also is consistent with 
increased risk and return around information events where the event date is known in advance.16 
Panel B presents the daily prediction errors around the second board meeting. The mean 
abnormal return is insignificantly positive. Although the actual discount is announced, investors 
should be able to anticipate the discount as of the first board meeting date based on recent 
experience with equity issues. Therefore, the announcement effect of the discount on the second 
board meeting day, on average, is close to zero. 
Panes C presents the daily prediction errors around the subscription period. The mean 
abnormal returns are significantly positive until the end of the subscription period and then, a 
significantly negative abnormal return is observed on the following day. This is consistent with 
the stock price stabilization by the underwriters because price stabilization is allowed during this 
period by the MOF. The Lease, Masulis and Page's order flow imbalance "argument" does not 
appear to hold during the subscription period in Japan. 
Panel D presents the daily prediction errors around the issue date. Day 0, the issue date, is 
15
 We use a three-day period around the first board meeting to calculate the abnormal 
announcement return, therefore including day -1. However, the mean two-day CAR (for days 0 
and +1) is also significantly positive with a point estimate of 0.29% and a t-stat of 2.25. 
16
 Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) discuss this point in terms of dividend announcement and ex-
dividend dates. There is also a growing body of rational expectations models in the accounting 
literature that suggests rational risk and return increases prior to accounting information releases, 
e.g. Demski and Feltham (1994). 
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significantly negative, however, the mean abnormal return for day +1 is significantly positive 
indicating a rebound in stock prices. Although Japanese investors are not able to purchase new 
shares on the issue day, a part of the investors who purchased new shares at discount have 
incentive to sell these new shares on the issue day. This sequence of prices, negative on the issue 
day and rebounding prices after the issue day is consistent with the Lease, Masulis, and Page 
"order-flow imbalance" argument. 
C. Comparison with the Kang and Stulz (1995) study 
Kang and Stulz, investigating the period from 1985 to 1991, calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns with reference to the newspaper announcement day of the common stock issue 
rather than the board meeting date used in this study. In addition, their sample excludes 
"financial" companies, i.e., banks, securities firms, and insurance companies, but includes both 
first and second section TSE firms. For the 185 public offering announcements included in their 
study, they report a mean cumulative abnormal return for days -1 and day 0 of 0.0051 (t-stat = 
2.32) and 0.0045 (t-stat = 1.73) for days -1, 0, and +1. 
In order to compare our results with the Kang and Stulz study, we restrict our data set to 
non-financial companies and calculate CARs around the earlier of the following newspaper story 
dates: Manager Ann., News 7, or News 2. We find a mean cumulative abnormal return of 0.0047 
(t-stat = +3.33) for days -1 and 0 and a mean of 0.0039 (t-stat = +2.26) for days -1, 0, and +1, 
with 404 and 395 observations respectively. These results are qualitatively similar to both our full 
sample and to the results of Kang and Stulz. 
Kang and Stulz also document a drop in stock price on the issue day, but find no evidence 
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of a price rebound. Kang and Stulz speculate that a possible explanation for the negative return 
on the issue day involves stock price stabilization by the underwriter. If the stock price was 
supported until the stock issue day, then a decline in stock price would be expected after the issue 
is sold to the public and price support is removed . However, this argument is not consistent with 
the equity offering process around the issue day. As described in the previous section, payment 
is made during the subscription period, which is several days before the issue day in Japan. The 
price stabilization by the underwriters is allowed only until the end of the subscription period. 
We find a significant negative abnormal return on the issue day and a significant positive 
return on the day after the issue day, supportive of a price rebound. In addtion to the issue day, 
we observe negative excess returns on the day after the end of the subscription period. 
Removal of the underwriter's stock price support at the end of the subscription period is 
consistent with a fall in the stock price on the following day. 
V. TESTS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS, DISCOUNTS, AND OFFERING METHOD 
Certification hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between the announcement 
return and the offer price's discount below the market price; in other words, the higher the 
discount, the lower the certification, and the lower the announcement effect. The offering method 
is also an important determinant of the degree of underwriter certification. Because of the shorter 
time period between the offering-price determination day and the subscription period, underwriter 
certification should play less of a role in the market's reassessment of firm value with formula-
price offerings than with fixed-price offerings. In addition, formula offerings can be canceled up 
until the offer-price determination day, making the whole issue of underwriter certification 
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possibly moot. For both of these reasons, announcement effects for formula-price offerings 
should be lower than for fixed-price offerings. 
In this section, we perform two sets of tests regarding the certification hypothesis. First, 
we look at the mean announcement period CARs and variability of stock returns for the two 
offering methods: fixed-price and formula-price offerings. Second, we use multiple regressions to 
analyze the role of the discount, offering method, and additional control variables to explain the 
announcement period CARs. 
A. Abnormal Returns and the Offering Method 
Table 5 presents abnormal returns results for two event periods: 1) one day before to one 
day after the first board meeting, and 2) one day after the second board meeting; and for two 
distinct time periods, before the formula offering was introduced and after the formula offering 
was introduced. The first official announcement of the upcoming equity issue and of the offering 
method, fixed-price versus formula-price, is made at the first board meeting. The announcement 
of the discount and other details of the upcoming stock issue are made at the second board 
meeting and are posted after the close of trading; therefore the announcement effect for the 
second period of investigation can be narrowed to one day. 
The effect of the offering method on stock prices is observed by partitioning the sample 
into four subsamples: from 1974 to November 1983, from December 1983 to August 1991, fixed-
price offerings from December 1983 to August 1991, and formula-price offerings over this same 
period. This partition of the sample allows the analysis of differences in the fixed and formula 
subsamples over the period when both were available to issuing firms and their underwriters. 
24 
Figures for the entire sample are provided for comparison purposes. 
All event periods show positive and significant abnormal returns for the 12/83 to 8/91 
fixed-price offerings. Event-period abnormal returns for the formula-price offerings are 
insignificantly different from zero and are significantly lower than the fixed-price offering sample. 
In summary, examination of the data split into the two types of offerings indicates that the overall 
positive announcement effect is almost entirely attributable to the fixed-price offerings. 
Several studies have identified high pre-announcement variance and high pre-
announcement stock price run-up as exerting a negative influence on the equity issue 
announcement return [for example, see Loderer, Cooney, and V an Drunen (1991), Dierkens 
(1991), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) and Chow Masulis and Nanda (1993)]. Table 5 
shows that these effects are reversed for our sample; high pre-announcement variance and high 
pre-announcement run-up are associated with fixed-price offerings, which exhibit the highest 
announcement effects. In addition, the variance change during the offering period is significantly 
negative for the firms with fixed offerings. The results are consistent with the certification 
hypothesis and contrast with U.S. results. 
For U.S. issuers, Dierkens (1991), argues that high pre-announcement variance is a proxy 
for high investor uncertainty about firm value. Also, an abnormal stock price increase followed by 
a stock issue can signal overvaluation in the firm's stock price.17 Consider a subset of firms with 
high pre-announcement variance and high pre-announcement stock price run-up. Potential 
17Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) call this the "naive trading rule" hypothesis and 
offer this as a possible explanation for the observed preannouncement stock price increase and 
subsequent announcement day price drop. However, they do not find evidence supportive for this 
hypothesis. 
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investors in these companies would be uncertain about its value and would presume, if the firm 
announces a stock issue, that it is overvalued. In this setting, a stock issue announcement should 
result in a sharp decline in stock prices. It is possible that the firm's true value is actually above 
the current stock price, but that this undervaluation could not be credibly communicated to 
potential investors. 
Unlike the U.S., the equity issuance process in Japan allows firms to signal their 
undervaluation through underwritten equity offerings. The highest level of underwriter 
certification is provided by fixed-price offerings. Therefore, undervalued firms that have high pre-
announcement stock price variance and high pre-announcement stock price run-up would benefit 
the most from a fixed-price offering. In these offerings, underwriters certify that the correct value 
for the stock is at least as great as the offer price. This not only causes an increase in stock value 
on the equity issue announcement date, but also causes a decrease in investor uncertainty about 
the true firm value. The decrease in residual equity variance after the stock issue observed with 
the fixed-price subsample is consistent with this story. Firms with lower pre-announcement 
variance and stock-price run-up, on the other hand, would not need the same level of certification 
and could use formula-price offerings. With the lower level of certification, investor uncertainty 
will not decline as much as with a fixed-price offering. 
B. Regression Equations 
A complete investigation of the certification hypothesis is performed with a multiple 
regression analysis. We divide our sample into the before 1983 period (fixed offering only) and 
the after 1983 period (both fixed and formula offerings). For each subsample, we run two 
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regressions. In regression one, the three-day CARs around the first board meeting date is used as 
a dependent variable. In the second regression, the abnormal return on the day after the second 
board meeting is used as a dependent variable. 
According to the certification model, Offering Method (a dummy variable equal to 0 if a 
fixed-price offering and 1 if a formula-price offering) should be negatively related to the Board 1 
announcement return for the second period. Expected Discount is also used as an independent 
variable for the first regression to capture the effect of the discount. Investors should be able to 
anticipate the discount as of the first board meeting date based on recent experience with equity 
issues. A reasonable approximation for the public's anticipated discount is the average discount 
for all sample firms during each of the years in our study. Since the average discount fell during 
our sample period, the expected discount also proxies for the year of announcement (the 
correlation between the expected discount and year of announcement is -0.90826). We expect to 
observe a negative relationship between the expected discount and the three day CARs. 
In the second regression, Discount Forecast Error is used as an explanatory variable. 
Discount Forecast Error is defined as the actual discount minus the expected discount. If the 
discount forecast error is negative, the underwriter's guarantee of value is at a higher level than 
expected. This will cause investors to revise their estimate of firm value upward. Therefore, 
according to the certification model, Discount Forecast Error should be negatively related to the 
Board 2 announcement return, especially for fixed price method firms. Discount forecast error of 
the formula offering firms is not as important as that of the fixed offering firms because there 
exists a cancellation option as well as the shorter interval between price determination day and the 
subscription period. 
27 
The following control variables are added and presented in the first regressions: Issue 
Size, Firm Size, Keiretsu status, and industry classification dummy variables. Issue Size, Firm 
Size, and industry are traditional variables used in many empirical studies to control for 
contracting costs, information costs, and risk. Issue Size is calculated as the number of shares 
issued in the stock offering divided by the firm's outstanding shares as of the end of the month 
prior to the first board meeting. The firm's relative size in relation to all other first-section firms 
is measured by the percentile ranking of the issuing firm's market value of equity as of the end of 
the month prior to the first board meeting.18 
The dummy variable keiretsu (value of one if a keiretsu firm) was added to control for this 
uniquely Japanese form of industrial organization. Communication of the firm's private value to 
the underwriter is more likely if the underwriter is a member of the issuing firm's keiretsu group. 
Since the ability to convey the firm's true value to the underwriter is a critical assumption in the 
certification model, the keiretsu dummy should be positively related to the announcement return. 
Furthermore, the offering method may be a proxy for the keiretsu/non-keiretsu classification if the 
keiretsu firms are more likely to use fixed-price offering, for example. 
The results are presented in Table 6. Consistent with the underwriter certification model, 
Offering Method is highly significant for the second period. The regression coefficient for 
18
 The percentile ranking is equal to a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of firms 
from the first section of the TSE with a market value of equity (MVE) less than the MVE of the 
issuing firm, divided by the total number of firms in the first section of the TSE (excluding the 
issuing firm and other firms with missing values). For example, a value of 0.70 means that the 
issuing firm's MVE is greater than 70% of all other first section TSE firms as the end of the month 
prior to the first board meeting. 
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Expected Discount is negative and significant for the first period and insignificant for the second 
period. The coefficient of Discount Forecast Error is insignificantly negative for the first period 
and significantly negative for the second period. A significantly positive coefficient for {Discount 
Forecast Error) x {Offering Method) indicates that Discount Forecast Error is not critical for 
formula offerings. None of the control variables show any significance except for several industry 
dummy variables as reported in Table 6. 
These results provide evidence in favor of the certification model. Namely, CARs around 
the first board meeting date are higher when expected discounts are small and when the fixed-
price offering method is used. In addition, after controlling for the size of the expected discount 
and the offering method, Discount Forecast Error exhibits a negative and significant coefficient 
for the fixed offering firms when regressed against the Board 2 announcement return. This 
evidence indicates that, other things equal, investors react positively when the actual discount is 
less than the expected discount. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Equity issue announcement effects, on average negative in the U.S., are significantly 
positive in Japan. This paper, which is the first comprehensive study of Japanese equity issues 
over the period 1974 - 1991, explores the contribution of a different equity issue process in 
explaining the difference in results across the two countries. Unlike U.S. equity issues, Japanese 
underwriters using the fixed-price offering method set the offer price a median of seven trading 
days before the end of the subscription period. The underwriters' certification of value causes 
investors, uncertain of the firm's true value, to revise their expectation of firm value upward upon 
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announcement of the upcoming stock offering. In this certification model, the offer price 
represents the minimum possible value for the firm's stock. Therefore, the higher the offer price, 
in relation to the firm's stock price, the higher the announcement effect. The offer-price discount, 
equal to the percentage difference between the market value of the firm's stock and the offer 
price, is predicted to be negatively correlated with the announcement effect. In a formula-price 
offering, the offer price is set closer in time to the subscription period, and the stock offering may 
be canceled if there is a significant decline in stock price. Since formula-price offerings do not 
provide the same level of certification as fixed-price offerings, the announcement effect should be 
lower. 
Results consistent with the underwriter certification model are presented. Namely, the 
average announcement effect for firms using the fixed-price method is positive, but the average 
announcement effect is zero for firms using the formula-price offering method. (Announcement 
effect for both types of offerings, however, are higher than equity issue announcement effects in 
the U.S.) Discount also plays an important role in the announcement period stock price changes. 
After controlling for the offering method, a significant negative correlation is found between the 
announcement day return and the expected discount. A significant negative relationship is also 
observed between the discount forecast error and the abnormal returns on the day the actual 
discount is announced for fixed offerings. High preannouncement variance and high 
preannouncement run-up is observed for the fixed price offering firms. The decrease in residual 
equity variance after the equity issue is also observed. These results are also consistent with 
certification hypothesis. 
During the subscription period, positive abnormal returns are observed. However, the 
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stock price significantly fell, on average, on the following day. This finding is consistent with the 
underwriter stock price stabilization. We also investigate issue-day stock returns. Similar to U.S. 
equity issues, stocks decline on the issue day, but rebound after the announcement day. This 
pattern of daily stock price changes is consistent with the order-flow imbalance model presented 




Yearly number and value (in billions of Yen) of common stock offerings, and percentage discount (one minus the offer price divided 
by the closing stock one day before the offer-price determination day). Panel A: Sample firms and market-wide figures for the period 
1974-1993. Panel B: Firms using the fixed-price offering method vs. the formula-price offering method for the period 12/1983 -
1993. 
Panel A: Sample Firms and Market-Wide Figures 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics - Continued 
Panel B: Fixed-Price and Formula-Price offerings (1984 -1993) 
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Table 2 
Average Number of Days Involved in Issue Process 
Number of trading days between various event days involved in the announcement and issue of common stock. Variable definitions are 
provided in the text. 
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Table 3 
Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Cumulative abnormal returns, t-statistics, fraction positive, and number of observations for five different event periods surrounding the 
announcement and issue of common stock. Normal returns are calculated using one of four different methods: OLS market-model method, 
Scholes-Williams method, mean-adjusted method, and market-adjusted method. For the first three methods, both a pre announcement (390 
trading days to 251 trading days before the first board meeting date announcing the stock issue) and a post-issue estimation period (31 
trading days to 170 trading days after the stock issue date) are used to calculate the normal return. 
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Table 3 
Event Period Abnormal Returns - Continued 
36 
Table 4 
Daily Prediction Errors 
Daily prediction errors, t-statistics, fraction positive, and number of observations for the 11-trading days around the date of the first board 
meeting announcing the stock issue, the date of the second board meeting announcing details of the stock offering, the end of the 
subscription period, and the issue date. Normal returns are calculated using the Scholes-Williams method with a post-issue estimation 
period (31 days to 170 days after the stock issue date). 
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Table 5 
Fixed-Price and Formula Offerings 
Cumulative abnormal returns, t-statistics, fraction positive, and number of observations for four different event periods surrounding the 
equity issue announcement day (Board 1), the announcement day of the discount (Board 2), and issue day of common stock. Normal 
returns are calculated using the Scholes-Williams method with a post-issue estimation period (31 days to 170 days after the stock issue 
date). Pre announcement Variance is the residual equity variance calculated over the period from 500 days before to 71 days before the 
first board meetings. Variance Change is equal to the post-announcement residual equity variance calculated over the period from 71 days 
after to 500 days after the issue date minus the Pre announcement Variance. *, **, *** indicate that the mean value for the fixed-price 
subsample (12/83 - 8/91) is significantly different than the mean CAR for the formula-price subsample (12/83 - 8/91) at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels of significance respectively. 
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Table 5 




Coefficients and (t-stats) for a regression of the three-day CAR around the first board meeting date, CAR_1 to +I (Board 1), and the day after 
the second board meeting, AR+1 (Board 2), against various explanatory and control variables. The respective regression equations are 
estimates over two periods: February 1974 to November 1983 (only fixed offerings allowed) and December 1983 to August 1991 (fixed 
and formula offerings allowed). 
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Market-Adjusted Cumulative Excess Returns 
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